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ABSTRACT

The current proposals to change the patent laws are described by proponents as
patent law "reform." In the 215 year history of the United States patent system,
Congress has rarely purported to "reform" the system. Indeed, I am not sure that it
has ever done so since the 1836 Act-or even since the 1793 Act. If we are to have
"reform," Congress should reform the system for the better of all concerned according
to neutral principles.
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DONALD S. CHISUM**

INTRODUCTION

The movement for major, substantive, legislative reform in 2005 is strongstronger than at any point in recent memory. The purpose of this piece is not to
examine the merits of the many reform proposals. Rather, this piece looks at the
process and suggests some neutral principles that should govern such reform-but,
that unfortunately may not, given the realities of the political process.

I. GROWING MOMENTUM FOR PATENT LAW REFORM: MICROSOFT AS AN EXAMPLE

Proposals to reform the patent system have been around a long time-and many
of them have not changed much, such as the proposal for the United States to switch
from its "first-to-invent" priority principles to the "first-to-file" priority principle and
to adopt "post-grant opposition" to patents in the patent office. But, in the past,
there has been much inertia against reform proposals. There are many interest
groups that participate in, or are affected by, the patent system, and probably none
are fully satisfied with the system. But there has been no consensus on what to
change and how. And change without consensus was impossible in a Congress not
much concerned about these sorts of technical matters. So, legislation has been
incremental, from responding to particular problems to requirements to conform to
international obligations, or to address the particularly sensitive area of patents on
pharmaceutical products.1
Reform gained significant momentum with the publication of two studies of the
patent system. The first was by a Committee of the National Academies. 2 The
second was by the Federal Trade Commission.3 Both studies concluded that the
patent system served valuable public policies but currently suffered from serious
flaws.
* This paper was originally prepared for and is the revised text of a speech delivered at the
annual Judge's Dinner held by the Pittsburgh Intellectual Property Law Association on April 27,
2005.
**Inez Mabie Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; Of Counsel, Morrison &
Foerster LLP. The author would like to thank Karl Maersch of Jones Day for his editorial
assistance.
1 See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (Dec. 8, 1994)
(enacted to approve and implement the trade agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations).
2 COMM.

ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE

KNOWLEDGE-BASED

ECONOMY,

THE

NATIONAL ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 119 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds.
2004).
3

Federal Trade Comm'n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and

Patent Law and Policy, ch. 5, at 31 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovation
rpt.pdf.
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The reform proposals recommended by these two studies overlapped, and their
potential influence was significant-because neither represented entities or groups
with direct financial interests in the patent system. An organization that does
comprise such groups, the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA)
weighed in-responding to the recommended reforms, approving some, disapproving
others. 4 AIPLA is holding "Town Hall Meetings" around the country, the stated
5
purpose being to collect views on reform proposals.
I, for one, was skeptical that these types of studies would give enough "push" to
patent law reform to overcome the inertia. But another "force" has been added to
movement for patent law reform: that of substantial private interests and companies.
I will single out as an example, Microsoft, the software giant all of us are so aware of.
However, other private sector interests are at work on patent law reform. Microsoft
has run newspaper advertisements espousing in general terms the need to reform the
patent system.6 Its executives-not just legal counsel-have given speeches in the
cause for patent law reform. 7 If it sounds like I have singled Microsoft out for strong
criticism; that is not my intent. In fact, I am sympathetic toward some of Microsoft's
problems with patent system. My purpose is to use Microsoft's problems with the
patent system and its response as explicative of what we face with patent law reform.
Microsoft is in an interesting position. Historically, it was not much interested
in strong IP protection, perhaps because, as some believe, it "lifted" much of its
technology from others, such as Xerox and Apple.8 But certainly today it is heavily
dependent on IP protection. Where would Microsoft be without effective copyright
protection for its software, such as the Windows operating system? Historically, it
showed little interest in patents. But just a year or two ago, it announced that it was
adopting an aggressive policy of patenting its technology and licensing it. 9 It even
hired the former chief licensing executive of IBM. 10 So, Microsoft must favor strong
IP protection. However, the counterpoint is that Microsoft itself becomes a very big
target for patent licensing and infringement claims by others.
4 AIPLA Response to the Nat'l Academies Report entitled "A Patent System for the 21st
Century", available at http://www.aipla.org/Template.cfm?Section=By-Organization&template=/
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=5544; AIPLA Response to the October 2003
Federal Trade Comm'n Report: To Promote Innovation." The ProperBalance of Competition and
Patent Law and Poliey, available at http://www.aipla.org/Template.cfm?Section=By-Organization&
template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=4753.
5 See Town Hall Meetings on Patent Reform, at http://www.aipla.org/Template.cfm?template=/
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=7974.
6 Microsoft Advertisement, A Call For Reform: The patent system has served Americans well,
but it needs attention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at A23. The Advertisement is also available at
http://www.microsoft.com/issues/essays/2005/03-15patents.asp (last visited May 19, 2005).
7 Grant Gross, Microsoft calls forpatentreform, IDG NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 10, 2005), available
at http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/03/1O/HNmicrosoftpatent-1.html.
S Michael Louka, Apple licensed technology from Xerox and improved on it, CNET NEWS.COM
(Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://news.com.com/5208-1016-0.html?forumlD=1&threadlD=6103&
messagelD=38010 &start=-114 (suggesting that Microsoft has stolen ideas from Apple in the past).
9 Press Release, Microsoft Intellectual Property Licensing (Aug. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/ip/.
10 Press Release, Marshall Phelps Corporate Vice President and Deputy General Counsel,
Intellectual Property (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/mphelps/
default.asp.
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II. RECENT "BIG TICKET" CASES

Partially explaining the new, intensified interest in patent law reform in the
private sector may be some recent cases, widely reported in the business press. I cite
three:
First case: a lawsuit against the "BlackBerry" company, Research in Motion, by
a patent holding company.1 1 The case resulted in the United States Court of Appeals
12
for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") affirming a judgment of patent infringement.
There was an imminent threat that an injunction would close down the entire
BlackBerry system, to the consternation of many, including Congressional staffers
who apparently depend on their Blackberries.1 3 Research in Motion recently settled
14
for $450 million-cash up front, no stock or other "funny money."
Second case: reported just last week, Medtronic, the medical device maker,
settled infringement claims regarding spinal surgery technology with an inventor,
Dr. Gary Michelson and his private patent holding company Karlin Technology, for
$550 million.1 5 Medtronic also agreed to buy the entire Michelson patent portfolio for
an additional $800 million.16
Finally: A recent appeal involved a judgment, based on a jury verdict, against
Microsoft for $540 million.1 7 The appeal was a split decision.18 The CAFC upheld
infringement, but remanded the case for further proceedings on the validity of the
patent in question. 19 From the opinion, I would estimate that Microsoft has a very
good chance of proving the patent invalid or unenforceable-and thus escaping the
huge judgment. But the size of the judgment attracted attention beyond Microsoft's
headquarters.
These cases may only be the tip of the iceberg and they suggest that litigation
and transactions regarding patents have grown large enough to represent serious
money, even for major corporations and Washington, D.C. insiders. No longer are
the big stakes are confined merely to the pharmaceutical and regulated chemicals
industries.
So, patent law reform is now serious business, and not just among patent
lawyers and academics, giving the reform movement greater force.

11NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
12 Id.

at 1372.

13See Jonathan Krim, House Makes a Plea To Keep BlackBe±riys, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2003

at E01.
1'Press Release, Research In Motion And NTP Agree To Resolve Litigation (Mar. 16, 2005)
available at http://www.rim.net/news/press/2005/pr-16 03 2005-01.shtml.
"I See Denise Gellene, L.A. Surgeon to Be Paid$1.35 Billion for Patents,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2005, at 1.
16 Id.
17

Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

18See id. at 1328.

19 Id. at 1341.
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III.

WHAT IS "WRONG" WITH THE PATENT SYSTEM?

In assessing all this, I start with a very general description of what is alleged to
be "wrong" with the patent system. If it ain't broke, don't fix it. How is the patent
system deemed to be broken by proponents of reform?
A first and perhaps primary complaint is that there is a continuing surge in the
volume of patent applications and patents that is overwhelming the system. 20 The
statistics are indeed scary.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office
21
("USPTO") has hundreds of thousands of pending, not-yet-examined applications.
In addition to the volume, the applications deal with a wide range of subject matter,
ranging from the cutting edge in technological complexity-for example,
nanotechnology-to the mundane. In the latter category are a regular flow of what
may be regarded as "silly" patents, which are a bit embarrassing to those who regard
the patent system as indeed serious and important. The most recent one getting
publicity is U.S. Pat. No. 6,004,596.22 Claim 1 describes a "sealed crustless
sandwich" comprising, inter alia, a certain "crimped edge" between "a first bread
23
layer" and a "second bread layer" and "at least one filing of an edible food."
Dependent claims 4, 5 and 6 limit the claim to three fillings. 24 Dependent claim 7
limits the claim to first and third fillings of "peanut butter" and a second filing "of a
jelly."25 So, a patent claiming a peanut butter and jelly sandwich-of, presumably,
an improved sort. How could the USPTO issue such thing-with so much "prior art"
out there?
It is charged that the USPTO does not-and perhaps cannot-competently
examine all these applications. If it cannot handle a peanut butter sandwich, what
can we expect with nanotechnology, etc. The result, it is charged, is that a lot of
"weak" patents issue-patents that can be attacked only with difficulty and great
expense in the United States district courts.
Related to this concern about general volume and quality is the alleged existence
of "patent thickets." 26 A thicket exists when there are numerous patents held by
different entities, each of which may be technologically and legally distinct, but all of
which overlap to cover actual commercial products.
So, a company desiring
legitimately to launch a product cannot do so without getting multiple licenses, which
may be difficult because of unreasonable independent demands-or because it is too
difficult to determine which of the patent "thorns" in the thicket endanger the
product.

20

See John W. Schoen, US. patent office swamped by backlog (Apr. 27, 2004), available at

http ://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4788834/.
21 See Michael S. Malone, The Smother of Invention, FORBES, June 24, 2002, at 32 (providing
that as of 2002, the USPTO was receiving more than 375,000 patent applications each year and was
faced with a backlog of more than 350,000 applications).
22 U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (issued Dec. 21, 1999).
23 Id. at col. 4, 11. 15-32.
24 Id. at col. 4,11. 38-54.
25 Id. at col. 4,11. 58-59.
26 See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents FacilitateFinancingin the Software Industry 83 TEX. L.
REV. 961, 999 (2005) (discussing the notion of a patent thicket in the area of software industry).
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And then there are the patent "trolls." I looked up the traditional, dictionary
meaning of "troll" but did not find it helpful. Roughly, those expressing concern
about "trolls" seem to mean individuals, small companies, or investment groups who
obtain, by issue or by purchase, patents but who do not actually produce anything
under the patent or even enter into prospective, cooperative licensing
arrangements. 27 Instead, a troll hides under bridges, metaphorically speaking,
waiting for companies to produce and market products, that is, to approach and cross
the bridge. The ugly, evil troll then leaps up and demands a huge toll, that is, a
licensing fee settling actual or threatened patent litigation, litigation that could
result in an injunction halting the product line. (The folks at the BlackBerry
Company undoubtedly used words stronger than "troll" to describe the patent owner
they had to buy off for $450 million.) A troll is particularly irritating to a company
that not only has a successful product but also a strong patent portfolio covering its
product. Faced with a competitor, the company could assert its own patent portfolio
and reach a reasonable cross-licensing arrangement. But a troll does not need a
license and therefore is uninterested in cross-licensing.
Yet another problem, in some minds, is the existence of a power appellate court,
the CAFC. It is suggested that the court is prone to erratic and unpredictable
decision-making. 28 The court is also accused of changing the law or making new law
without a reasoned and persuasive reason for doing so. 29 Ironically, the judges of the
CAFC, in their opinions, stress the need for clarity and certainty with patents, for
"public notice" of what patents cover and what they do not. 30 Yet many see the court
itself endangering long term certainty because of its rapid and oscillating
development of rules through its case law.

IV. THE REFORM BILL
In response to these and other perceived ills, the patent law reform movement
has produced at least one actual draft legislation for "discussion." It is available as a
"Committee Print," which is for discussion purposes in oversight hearings that have

27 Id. at 1023. The term "patent troll" was apparently invented by scientists at Intel as a pun

on the dual use of the word in English to refer both to a type of fishing in which a hook is dangled
while the fisher moves slowly looking for prey and also to the ogre-like Scandinavian creature found
in caves and under bridges. Id. at 1023 (citing Paul McFedries, Patent Troll, The Word Spy (Aug.
13, 2003), available at http://www.wordspy.com/words/patenttroll.asp).
28 See, e.g., Robert F. Kramer & Marc J. Pernick, The Federal Cireuits'En Bane Consideration
of Claim Construction in Phillips v. A WH Corp., PATENT STRATEGY & MGMT., Mar. 2005, at 1;

Daniel H. Shulman & Donald W. Rupert, "Vitiating"the Doctrineof Equivalents.'A New PatentLaw
Doctrine, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 457 (2003); Robert L. Harmon, When a Patent Claim is BroaderThan the
Disclosure. The Federal Circuit's Game Has No Rules, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 21

(2001).

e.g., Shulman, supra note 28, at 457.
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting motion for rehearing en
banc and inviting briefing on public notice function of patent claims); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting the need for
29 See,

30

certainty in the process of enforcing patent rights).
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been held recently.3 1 It does not yet have a bill number-so I will refer to it as the
"Reform Bill." It contains numerous major changes in the substance and procedures
of patent law.
The very title of the bill, the "Patent Act of 2005", confirms that we are talking
about patent law reform, not merely amendments to resolve specific problems as in
32
the past.

V. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GOVERN REFORM

If we are to have fundamental patent law reform, I propose that it should be
governed not solely by political clout and by compromises among specific interest
groups, as has often been the case with patent legislation over the past 25 years.
Rather, it should take into account, in part, some higher level "neutral principles,"
which emphasize the long-term perspective and the interests of all persons and
institutions affected by the patent system. For example, consideration should be
given to the impact of any changes on the court system, especially the workload of
federal district court judges, who must grapple with the incredible complexities of
patent litigation while performing other duties of the utmost importance to our
society. Indeed, perhaps Congress should require itself to issue a "judicial impact
statement" for any proposed changes in patent or other litigation-intensive areas of
the law.
A word of caution: I do not suggest that one can extract from neutral principles
of reform one and only one answer to whether and how specifically to change the
patent laws. A wide range of choices based on policy and influence can be made. But
a given policy choice can usually be implemented in a number ways. The idea of
neutral principles is that some implementing ways are better in terms of cost, clarity
and efficiency.
Here are some tentative suggestions of neutral principles and how they might
apply to current proposals for reform.
The first principle should be simplicity. This is an application of the venerable
philosophical principle called Occam's Razor: do not multiply entities beyond
necessity! 33 Cut rather than embellish. Another adage might apply: some games are
not worth the candle.
It should always be asked: does a proposed change make the system simpler or
more complex in text and in operation? A pattern with prior patent legislation is to
do the latter: make it more complex. Complexity may make the system more precise
in achieving policy objectives, but it taxes the patent system in many ways-the costs
of training new professionals, new examiners, new attorneys-and, yes, new judges

31 Patent Act of 2005, H.R. -, 109th Cong. (2005), availableat Patently-Ct PatentLaw Blog
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/DraftPatentStatuteDDC.pdf [hereinafter Reform Bill].
32 See id. at 1.
33 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 860 (3d ed. 1985). Named after the philosopher William

of Ockham, the principle "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate" means "Plurality should not
be posited without necessity." Id.
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who likely have not had prior experience with patent law, not to mention increased
risk of human error, etc.
Second, and related to the first, is "zero-based budgeting." If a general rule is
creating problems, do not think solely in terms of creating exceptions to solve the
immediate problem.
Reconsider the worth of the general rule and consider
abolishing or fundamentally changing it. I will discuss in a moment how one
proposal in the Reform Bill, that on export of components, violates this principle.
But in other respects, it follows this principle-by, for example, abolishing entirely
the "best mode" disclosure requirement, and the rule that private "derived"
information is prior art.
Third, cost sensitivity. Always consider the direct and indirect cost impact-and
not just on certain vocal groups. Again, consider the impact on the courts, not just
the USPTO and the private sector.
Fourth, completeness and generality. In a true "reform" effort, the legislation
should address all perceptible problems, not merely those that impact influential
players.
The Reform Bill does not comply with this principle. For example, both the
Committee of the National Academies and the Federal Trade Commission, as well as
scholars and others, have criticized the absence from the United States patent
34
statutes of a well-defined exemption from infringement liability of research activity.
Every other major patent system-indeed every other United States intellectual
property system (copyright, trademark, plant variety protection, semiconductor chip
protection) has something in the nature of a "fair use" or research exemption. 35 Some
interest groups, especially those that own patents on "research tools" oppose such a
provision, even though properly drafted it would not seriously compromise their
patents. The Reform Bill contains no provision on a research exemption.
Another example is patent claim scope. How to interpret patent claims is the
number one issue in the patent system today; claim interpretation disputes enrich
litigators and threaten the sanity of district court judges.
As an example, in that patent on the sandwich, suppose the patent owner
asserts the patent against a competitor that is using "jam." Is "jam" literally jelly? If
not, does it infringe under the so-called doctrine of equivalents? Does it make a
difference that, during prosecution, the patent owner argued that its claimed peanut
butter and jelly sandwich had novel and unexpected advantages over the sealed,
prior art meat-pie sandwiches?
Recent CAFC panel decisions are in deep conflict. In the pending Philh'pscase,
the CAFC is mulling en banc some fundamental questions about claim

'3 See A PatentSystem for the 21st Century, supra note 4; To Promote Innovation: The Proper
Balance of Competition and PatentLaw and Poliey, supra note 4; see also Comments of Janice M.
Mueller at the San Jose AIPLA Town Hall meeting, available at http://www.aipla.org/Content/
ContentGroups/Meetings-andEvents 1/Roadshows/20058/TownMeetingSanJoseTranscript.pdf
(last visited May 20, 2005).
3, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (copyrights); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000) (trademarks); 7 U.S.C.
§ 2544 (2000) (research exemption for PVPA); 17 U.S.C. § 906 (2000) (providing an exception for
teaching, analyzing or evaluating in the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984).
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interpretation. 36 But one aspect of patent claim interpretation that no one seems to
question is the relevancy of the "prosecution history" of a patent-the detailed record
of the negotiations between the patent applicant and the patent office examiner. It is
taken for granted in the United States that the prosecution is relevant and must be
examined. But, as a practical matter, that adds greatly to the time and cost of
evaluating and litigating patents. Why not simply declare that the prosecution
history is inadmissible evidence and shall not be considered? That might lead to
unfairness in some few cases-as when the patent applicant had expressly declared
one interpretation during prosecution, but then adopts an inconsistent or broader
interpretation during litigation. But is it worth imposing such a hefty cost on the
evaluation of all patents merely to sift out a few such cases? Note that in the quite
viable European patent system, prosecution histories are not considered. But the
Reform Bill lacks any proposal addressing the claim scope quagmire.
Fifth, internationalcompatibility. Patent law reform should take into account
the inherently international character of both the development and exploitation of
technology and the operation of the patent system. Making the United States law
more consistent with the prevalent international standards on patents, especially in
Japan and Europe, is not a matter of idealistic harmonization of laws. Maintaining
disparate patent law standards in different countries creates real world problems.
Finally, ela"rity on effective dates. Changing the substantive rules on what is
patentable and the scope of protection of patents should be accompanied by careful
consideration and clarity on when the changes are effective. There are many issued
patents in force-more than a million-and about 300,000 applications in the
pipeline. The question: should the changes be retroactive, and if so to what extent, is
a difficult one to answer.
On the one hand, if the changes are made purely
prospective, then those interests who complain of the ills of the present patent
system would see virtually no relief for many years-5, 10, 15 or more. On the other
hand, if the changes are made fully retroactive, there will be understandable cries of
unfairness from many quarters. Under the proposed changes, patents that were
valid would become invalid. And patents that were not valid would become valid. An
attempt to provide certain intervening rights and other half-way solutions runs into
the principle of simplicity.
In this respect, the Reform Bill does have a detailed and complex provision on
"transition."
Without going into details, I would describe it as providing for
prospective application with some "partial" retroactivity.

'36 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (inviting briefing on questions
such as whether the public notice function of patent claims is better served by referencing primarily
dictionaries to interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee's use of the term in the
specification, and what role the prosecution history and expert testimony by one of ordinary skill in
the art should play in determining the meaning of the disputed claim terms).
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EXAMPLE: APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES TO THE REFORM BILL'S "EXPORT OF
COMPONENTS" PROVISION

With the rest of this paper, I would like to focus in a little more detail on a few of
the proposals in the Reform Bill to exemplify how reform proposals can be tested by
neutral principles of reform.
One proposal has to do with the transnational force of United States patent law
and is in response to a series of CAFC decisions.
The general principle is that a United States patent is effective against potential
infringements only if they occur in a United States territory. Thus, the primary
statutory provision, section 271(a) refers to unauthorized making, use, sale, and
37
offering to sell "in the United States"-or importing into the United States.
Assessing whether activity is in the United States is usually straightforwardbut it was not in the "BlackBerry" case.3 8 Boiled down to its essence, the patent
claimed a wireless e-mail system with three components, an "origination processor"
[A], an "interface switch" [B] and a "destination processor" [C].3 9 In the accused
BlackBerry system, A was a sending user, B was a "Relay", and C was receiving
user. 40 Most users A and receivers C are in the United States, but BlackBerry's
"Relay" [B] is outside the United States, in Canada. 41 One certainly might have
thought, applying basic patent law principles, that the infringement was not in the
United States.
The claim defines the invention-and it requires all three
components.
Nevertheless, the CAFC found infringement, reasoning that "the
location of the beneficial use and function of the whole operable system assembly is
the United States." 42 This was a bit odd. In many patent law contexts, the CAFC
emphasizes that it is the inventor's responsibility to craft the claims carefully and
accurately. 43 Here, the patent owner probably could have crafted claims so that they
read on entirely domestic acts-but it did not. Oh, well-only $450 million at stake.
Beyond the general principle stated in section 271(a), there two further
provisions, which key on acts in the United States that would usually not be
infringements but that result from-or lead to-otherwise infringing acts outside the
United States. In short, they focus on imports and exports.
Let's start with imports. Section 271(g) provides that importation, use or sale of
an unpatented product is an infringement if it is "made by" a process covered by a
United States patent. 44 So, if a manufacturer in China uses a United States patented
process to make a product, that is not an infringement-because the United States

'3735 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
'38See NTP,Inc. v. Research

in Motion, Ltd, 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
id. at 1350.
10 See id.at 1342.
41Id.at 1367.
42 Id.at 1369.
13 See, e.g., Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("However, as between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did
not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek
protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.").
44 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).
39 See
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patent does not apply in China. But if someone imports that product into the United
States, it is an infringement under section 271(g).
The 2003 Bayer case interpreted the meaning of the word "product," an
interpretation of interest when we get to the Microsoft case. 45 Again boiled down to
basics, the patent claimed a method or process for screening substances as likely
pharmaceutical drug candidates. 46 Bayer used the screening method in Germany to
select a composition for further testing. 47 In doing so, it generated data, that is,
"information", on the composition. 48 It then brought the information and the drug
composition into the United States, presumably for testing and potential commercial
sale. Was this an importation of a "product" made by the patented process? The
CAFC said "no." 49
Congress intended the words "product made" to mean
manufactured, physical goods.50 And the drug itself, though a product, was only
51
selected, not "made by" the patented process.
I would certainly question that conclusion. We live in an "information age" and
many valuable "products" are, in essence, information. Also, it is unclear how far
beyond pure "information" the court's holding extends. What of data or computer
software embedded in a machine-readable medium, such as a compact disc (CD)?
That such might not be excluded from being a "product" is suggested by one rationale
put forth by the court. The court was concerned that treating "information" as a
product might mean that "a person possessing the allegedly infringing information
[in his or her mind] could ...

infringe by merely entering the country."5 2 That would

not be true if a person enters the country with intangibles on a tangible medium.
Now let's turn to exports. In the 1972 Deepsouth case, the Supreme Court held
that an alleged infringer did not infringe a patent that claimed a machine with
combined components A, B and C, when it manufactured all three components and
shipped them to Mexico unassembled to a customer.53 The patent claimed only the
combination, and the accused combination was not "made" in the United States
54
because it was not combined into an operable assembly.
55
In 1984, Congress passed section 271(f) to close the supposed "loophole."
Essentially, section 271 provides that it is an infringement to "suppl[y] or cause to be
supplied" in or from the United States either (1)"all or a substantial portion of the
components of a patented invention" or (2) "any component" that is "especially made"
for use in a patented invention. 56 I will suggest in a moment that this amendment is
a bad one from a policy point of view. But there it is, for the time being.

45Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
46See id. at 1368.

47See id.
48Id.at 1370.
49Id.at 1378.
M0Id. at 1377.
51Id.at 1377-78.
52Id.
' Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972).
54 Id.at

528.

5 130 Cong. Rec. H10525 (1984) ("This proposal responds to the ... decision in Deepsouth...
concerning the need for a legislative solution to close a loophole in patent law.").
56 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2004).
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One more case before we get to Microsoft. In the 2004 Pellegrinicase, a patent
claiming a circuit was asserted against a company that allegedly embodied the circuit
in its line of integrated circuit chips. 57 The alleged infringer designed the accused
chips in the United States and controlled the production and marketing of the chips
from its United States headquarters. 58 But the chips were actually manufactured
and sold outside the United States. 59 The CAFC found no infringement. 60 The
accused chips were not "cause[d] to be supplied from the United States." 61 For
section 271(f) to apply, the components of a patented invention must first be
physically present in the United States. 62 The court indicated that supplying or
causing to supply "clearly refers to physical supply of components, not simply to the
63
supply of instructions or corporate oversight."
Now we get to the Eolas v. Microsoft case, March 2, 2005.64 The patent
concerned a feature for internet browser computer software and claimed a "system"
and a "method."65 The patent is asserted against Microsoft, specifically its Windows
operating system, which includes the Internet Explorer browser. 66 Microsoft
develops Windows software in the United States, in Redmond, Washington, and sells
67
it to customers, including personal computer manufacturers in other countries.
Rather than sending multiple copies, it embeds Windows on something called a
"golden master disc" that it sends to the customer, who uses the disk to copy
Windows onto the PCs. 68 Has Microsoft supplied a "component" of the patented
system and method from the United States?
From our review of the case law, you can certainly see a strong argument for a
negative answer. In the import context, Bayer held that "product" was limited to
physical products. 69 In the export context, Pellegrini held that merely supplying a
design for the manufacture of a product abroad is not a "component." 70 Microsoft's
golden disk seems analogous to a "design" for creating components, not a component
itself.
But in Eolas, a CAFC panel held otherwise. Among other points, the panel
indicated that section 271(f) did "not impose a requirement of 'tangibility' on any
component of a patented invention."7 1 Pellegrlniwas distinguished as not addressing
the meaning of "components", but held only that there must be a physical supplying

57Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
58

Td. at 1117.

59Id.
30Id
61 ITd.

at 1118.

62 Id.
G3 Id.

61Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
65 Id.at

1330.

GGId.
67Id.

Id.
( Bayer A.G. v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1376, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
70Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
71 Eobas, 399 F.3d at 1340.
(3
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from the United States, which Microsoft did by making and exporting the golden
master disc.2
No doubt Eolas if sustained presents a major specific problem for Microsoft. It is
a defendant against numerous similar suits in which at least the measure of
damages depends on whether it is deemed to have exported "components" of the
numerous PC's made abroad. Interestingly, another Microsoft "golden disc" case was
argued to the CAFC, this time in a suit brought by AT&T. 73 Microsoft's attorney
attempted to distinguish Eo]as, arguing that the software on the golden disc may be
a component despite being intangible-but that it is not the software that is
"combined" abroad, as section 271(f) requires.
The point I wish to make is not whether Eolas is right or wrong but its
relationship to the patent law reform process. In view of Microsoft's quandary and
its campaign for patent law reform, we should not be surprised to find in the Reform
Bill the following amendment to section 271(f): "(3) An item supplied in or from the
United States is not a 'component' under this section unless the item is a tangible
item that is itself combined physically with other components to create the
74
combination that is alleged to infringe."
This provision neglects neutral principles of reform. We should not create an
exception to a general rule-without reassessing the rule itself. Section 271(f) is bad
policy because it punishes those who produce components domestically and exports
them and rewards those who move all production off shore. Section 271(f) should be
repealed, thereby simplifying the law.
Ironically, even if enacted, the change to section 271(f) would apparently not be
made retroactive. So, for its present suits and existing patents, Microsoft must labor
in the vineyards of patent litigation and "lobby" the CAFC.
Microsoft, facing a plague of suits against its Windows product, 75 also has an
interest in other proposals in the Reform Bill. For example, Microsoft and others
complain about the ability of the "trolls" and other patent owners to not only assert
infringement but to take draconian positions on remedies.
First, the trolls are said to always demand a damage royalty based on the whole
product even though the patented invention relates to only one part or feature of a
product. The Reform Bill's response: a new section 284(e) on "Determination of
Royalties or Damages on Components." 76 It says about what you would expect it to
say: damages only on "value" attributable to the patented "invention alone" and not
on elements "otherwise known in the art or contributed by the infringer or its
licensors." 77 I suspect that careful study would show that this is not necessary.
Basic principles of compensatory damage law should reach the same result. If a
royalty is based on the whole product rather than the part, the appropriate royalty
rate should be correspondingly low.
2 Id. at 1340-41.
73 AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
74 See Reform Bill, supranote 31, at 49.
75 See Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. 01-1380, 01-1381, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15602 (N.D.
Cal. July 17, 2002); Intertrust Techs. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. C 01-1640 SBA, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22736 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2003).
76 See Reform Bill, supranote 31, at 29.
77 Id. at 31.
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Second, the trolls are said to threaten an injunction against distribution of a
whole product-even though the troll is not producing a competing product. The
Reform Bill's response: permanent injunctions shall issue only on a finding that the
patentee "is likely to suffer irreparable harm that cannot be remedied by the
payment of money damages."78 The court should not presume irreparable harm and
must consider, inter alia, equitable factors including "the extent to which the
patentee makes use of the invention." 79 Again, this probably should be the law under
traditional principles of equity. For example, patents are often treated as property
rights. In property law generally, I am assured by colleagues who teach it or who
teach equity that injunctions to protect property rights are not automatic and take
into account equitable factors. But I admit that CAFC decisions tend to create a
presumption of irreparable harm-so some legislative correction may be appropriate.
Yet owners of patents, valid and infringed, traditionally have a right to enforce
them even if they are not producers. If the threat of injunctive relief is softened too
much, are they put at too great a disadvantage in terms of bargaining?

VII. CONCLUSION
The current proposals to change the patent laws are described by proponents as
patent law "reform." In the 215 year history of the United States patent system,
Congress has rarely purported to "reform" the system. Indeed, I am not sure that it
has ever done so since the 1836 Act-or even since the 1793 Act. The changes since
the early days were always characterized as amendments or codifications, and in fact
they were so. That is certainly true of the 1952 Act and the amendments in the
1980's and 1990's which admittedly made significant changes in matters such as the
term of a patent-but which did not change the fundamental standards of
patentability or the procedures for obtaining and challenging a patent.
If we are to have "reform," Congress should rise above the usual routine of
adjusting conflicting interests. It should reform the system for the better of all
concerned according to neutral principles such as those I have suggested.

7

8

Id. at 31-32.

79 Id. at 32.

